

# EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

## Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	D/PAO		X		
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks:

(I have thanked Colin Powell and told him DCI will see upon his return.)

Executive Secretary  
19 October 83

Date

**OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**THE MILITARY ASSISTANT**

10/18/83

NOTE FOR

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, CIA  
ROOM: 7E12

25X1

25X1

Secretary Weinberger wanted Mr. Casey to see the attached article--citing it as another example of journalistic distortion of the facts concerning the KAL 007 incident.



Colin L. Powell  
Major General, USA  
Senior Military Assistant  
to the Secretary of Defense

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Attachment

47570

C-315

Los Angeles Times

Sunday, October 16, 1983

## How U.S. Distorted Jet Crisis

By William Pfaff

PARIS

**N**ow it is conceded by American officials that the Russians did believe that the South Korean Boeing 747 shot down the night of Aug. 31-Sept. 1 was an American spy plane. U.S. newspapers report that American intelligence, having reviewed all of the evidence available, finds "no indication that the Soviet air-defense personnel knew it was a commercial plane before the attack."

U.S. intelligence is "confident that the SU-15 fighter involved was below and behind the airliner "where identification would have been difficult. It has reached "general agreement that the Soviet air-defense force had displayed a poor capacity to intercept aircraft in Soviet airspace, to distinguish between commercial and military aircraft and to identify a plane before shooting it down." These conclusions, the report says, were delivered to the White House two weeks after the attack.

So the Soviet Union has been telling

produced a glorious victory for the propaganda war. So it has, so far. If in the future something should come out to substantiate the Soviet claim that this 747 was on an intelligence mission of some nature, it will become not a propaganda catastrophe for the United States, but a moral catastrophe. Moreover, if this 747 was on U.S. service, it will eventually come out. Washington cannot keep secrets like that—not any longer. One prays that Capt. Chun Byung In of Korean Airlines—well known, it seems, for its cost-consciousness—was taking the short way home, presuming that even if he didn't get away with it, the worst thing that could happen would be a forced landing on Sakhalin.

When Soviet planes have intruded into U.S. airspace, U.S. policy has been to intercept them and escort the strangers off, subsequently protesting. Yet one wonders what would happen if a Soviet military plane entered U.S. airspace over New England and flew over a series of East Coast military installations, continued in this for 2½ hours, ignored orders to land and was finally over Cape Canaveral ready to turn out to the open sea towards Cuba. Would the United States necessarily have let it go?

Charles Z. Wick, head of the U.S. Information Agency, which made an immense propaganda project of the affair, says that it has provided "an unprecedented opportunity to show the truth, which is the greatest communication asset we have on behalf of the Free World against the disinformation of the Soviets. And that's what this contest is all about."

But the truth about the episode, as apparently has been known in Washington since mid-September, is not what the United States has been telling. A spokesman for the Department of State has said that whatever the truth of the matter, the position of the U.S. government would not change, since even if the Soviets were